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Conscious Pulse I:
The rules of engagement
Richard Mould
∗
Abstract
This paper elaborates on four previously proposed rules of engagement
between conscious states and physiological states. A new rule is proposed
that applies to a continuous model of conscious brain states that cannot
precisely resolve eigenvalues. If two apparatus states are in superposition,
and if their eigenvalues are so close together that they cannot be con-
sciously resolved on this model, then it is shown that observation will not
generally reduce the superposition to just one of its member eigenstates.
In general, the observation of a quantum mechanical superposition results
in another superposition.
Introduction
The author has proposed four rules that describe the relationship between con-
scious states of the brain and quantum physiology. In one paper, the rules
are successfully applied to a typical quantum mechanical interaction between a
particle and a detector [1]; and in another paper, they are successfully applied
to two different versions of the Schro¨dinger cat experiment [2]. In this paper,
the third rule is expanded to cover the case of continuous brain states; and in
a future paper, a final rule will be added that also applies to this continuous
case [3].
The first rule of the previous papers introduce quantum mechanical proba-
bility through the positive flow of probability current J , which is equal to the
time rate of change of square modulus. Probability is not otherwise defined in
this treatment.
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Rule (1) For any subsystem of n components in an isolated system with a
square modulus equal to s, the probability per unit time of a stochastic choice of
one of those components at time t is given by (ΣnJn)/s, where the net probability
current Jn going into the n
th component at that time is positive.
The ready brain state referred to in rule (2) is not conscious by definition, but
it is physiologically capable of becoming conscious if it is stochastically chosen.
Rule (2)If the Hamiltonian gives rise to new components that are not classi-
cally continuous with the old components or with each other, then all active brain
states that are included in the new components will be ready brain states.[Active
brain states are either conscious or ready states.].
The third rule describes a state reduction like Penrose’s process R. It is
understood to provide a new boundary condition.
Rule (3): If a component that is entangled with a ready brain state B is
stochastically chosen, then B will become conscious, and all other components
will be immediately reduced to zero.
The fourth rule is added to prevent certain anomalies from occurring as a
result of the first three rules by themselves.
Rule (4)A transition between two components is forbidden if each is an
entanglement containing a ready brain state of the same observer
As was our practice in the previous papers, a conscious brain state will be
represented by an underlined B, and a ready brain state B will appear without
an underline. In this paper, the different brain types Bk(α) and Bk(α) for a
particular state variable k are given as a function of brain variables α. For both
types we require.
∫
dαBr(α)
∗Bs(α) = δ(r − s) and
∫
dαBr(α)
∗Bs(α) = δ(r − s) (1)
A Conscious Brain Pulse - Rule (3a)
I assume that there is a limit to how sharply a conscious experience can be
defined. It is unphysical to imagine that a precisely defined physiological state
can support a knife-edge slice of consciousness. That is, a physiological state
Bk with exact eigenvalues cannot be expected to support “recognizable” con-
sciousness without involving other states in its immediate neighborhood. Any
real conscious experience therefore engages a group of neighboring states that
will hereafter be designated by the symbol {Bk}, where the brackets around Bk
specify a group of states with Bk at its center. I call this collection of states a
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conscious brain pulse, or just a conscious pulse. It is given by
{Bk} =
∫
duFk(u)Bu (2)
where
∫
duFk(u)
∗Fk(u) = 1
The states in {Bk} are not a statistical mixture because Fk(u) represents the
coefficients of a continuous superposition of quantum mechanical states Bu. Al-
though these have macroscopic dimension, they cannot display local interference
effects because of environmental decoherence as explained in ref. 1.
The conscious experience that is associated with a conscious brain pulse
will result from the collective effect of all the conscious states in the pulse
neighborhood, where the width of this pulse reflects a limit on the ability of the
brain to resolve the experience.
A ready brain state is not conscious; nonetheless, it will generally exist as
a similar collection of states {Bk} =
∫
duFk(u)Bu that will be called a ready
brain pulse1. If current flows into a component containing a pulse of ready
brain states, and if one of those states given by Bsc is stochastically chosen
from the pulse according to rule (1), then it will become conscious according to
rule (3). What happens after that is determined by the properties of the brain.
Specifically, the final result of a stochastic selection is not just the single state
Bsc, but the entire conscious pulse {Bsc}. After the pulse is formed, the special
status of Bsc is lost, except as it identifies the maximum of the resulting pulse.
It follows from the above definitions that the conscious and ready brain pulses
are themselves normalized.∫
dα {Bk}
∗{Bk} = 1 and
∫
dα {Bk}
∗{Bk} = 1 (3)
We will now supplement rule (3) by adding rule (3a). This describes what
happens to a stochastically chosen ready brain state in the present model. The
rule (3) conversion to a conscious state, and the reduction of all other states to
zero is assumed to take place in a single instant of time. After that, the brain’s
Hamiltonian will form a conscious pulse at a more leisurely physiological pace.
Rule (3a): The Hamiltonian of the brain will convert a chosen conscious state
into a conscious pulse whose width reflects the ability of the brain to resolve the
conscious experience.
1A ready pulse generally evolves from a conscious pulse, and will therefore take on the
functional form of that pulse. However, a ready state may also evolve under Schro¨dinger from
a single ‘unconscious’ state, in which case it will be a single ready state.
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Classically, a conscious experience is prompted by an external stimulus that
may be very sharply defined; and yet, there is a limit to how sharply it can be
experienced by the viewer. We classically deal with this by assuming that such
an incoming ‘sharp’ signal is spread out by physiological constraints contained
in the Hamiltonian. In the same way, rule (3a) claims that a single stochastically
chosen conscious state is converted by the brain into a conscious pulse, thereby
providing a space in the brain for a full conscious experience.
When a sharply defined stochastically chosen state dissolves into a broadly
defined pulse, discharge current will flow from it to its immediate neighbors.
In the process a normalized single state Bk becomes a normalized pulse {Bk},
thereby conserving current.
An Interaction
In an interaction like the one described in the previous paper, a conscious brain
state is initially correlated with an apparatus state A1(t), where the system
evolves under Schro¨dinger into a ready brain state that is correlated with an-
other apparatus state A2(t). Rule (2) requires the evolution of ready brain
states only. Let A1(t) be normalized to 1.0 at t0 = 0 and decrease in time,
and let A2(t) be zero at t0 and increase in time. We now amend the previous
description given in refs. 1 and 2 to refer to pulses rather than states.
Let the initial state of the system be given by A1(t){B1}, where {B1} is the
initial conscious pulse of the observer who is aware of the apparatus state A1;
and let every individual brain state in this pulse evolve under Schro¨dinger into
a corresponding ‘ready’ brain state. The emerging component in eq. 4 is then
A2(t){B2}, and the system prior to a stochastic choice at tsc is
Φ(tsc > t ≥ t0) = A1(t){B1}+A2(t){B2} (4)
where the entanglement A1(t){B2} is initially equal to zero.
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At the time of stochastic choice, a single ready state Bsc in {B2} is selected
and made conscious, with all other components going to zero as per rule (3).
Φ(tsc) = A2(tsc)F2(sc)Bsc
2As in previous papers, the pre-interaction apparatus states A1 or A2 are different than
the entangled apparatus states in eq. 4 because the latter include the “low level” physiology
of the observer. In this case, the entangled apparatus states must fan-out at the physiology
end into a superposition that connects with each component of the brain pulses.
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Rule (3a) requires that the single state Bsc subsequently becomes a pulse in
physiological time.
Φ(t > tsc) = A2(tsc)F2(sc){Bsc} (5)
The probability that the state (sc) in {B2} is stochastically chosen can be found
from the second component of eq. 4 by using the Born rule.
P (sc) = (1/s)
∫
dx
∫
dαA∗2A2F2(sc)
∗F2(sc){Bsc}
∗{Bsc}
= (1/s)F2(sc)
∗F2(sc)
∫
dxA∗2A2
where x refers to the apparatus variables, and s is the square modulus of the
first component in eq. 4. The total probability of a stochastic hit in the ready
pulse is then found by integrating over d(sc).
P = (1/s)
∫
d(sc)F2(sc)
∗F2(sc)
∫
dxA∗2A2 = (1/s)
∫
dxA∗2A2
where A∗2A2 is the square modulus when the interaction is complete.
The central state Bsc of the conscious pulse in eq. 5 is included in the original
ready pulse {B2}, but it is not necessarily the central state B2. Therefore, the
stochastically chosen state cannot be exactly determined by the Hamiltonian,
due to the inability of the brain to fully resolve the ready brain states that are
candidates for stochastic selection. As in previous cases, the reduction in eq. 5 is
not normalized. This does not affect probability calculations so long as rule (1)
is faithfully followed.
Unresolvable Observation
Let the system be a stationary superposition of apparatus states A1 and A2 at
time t0.
Φ(t0) = (A1 +A2){X} (6)
where {X} is an unknown conscious state of an observer who has not yet inter-
acted with the apparatus. At time tob the observer looks at the apparatus, and
the system becomes
Φ(t ≥ tob > t0) = [A1(t) +A2(t)]{X}
+ A′1(t){B1}+A
′
2(t){B2}
following rule (2). The primed components are zero at t0. Substituting eq. 2
Φ(t ≥ tob > t0) = [A1(t) +A2(t)]{X}
+
∫
du [A′1(t)F1(u) +A
′
2(t)F2(u)]Bu
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where the primed components in the second row increase and the unprimed
components in the first row go to zero in physiological time. As current flows
from the first to the second row, there is certain to be a stochastic hit on
one of the ready brain states according to rule (1). Looking at the system at
the moment rule (3) applies, but before rule (3a) can take effect, we find the
reduction
Φ(t = tsc > tob) = [A
′
1(tsc)F1(sc) +A
′
2(tsc)F2(sc)]Bsc
Rule (3a) now requires that the state Bsc dissolve into a pulse.
Φ(t > tsc) = [A1(tsc)F1(sc) +A2(tsc)F2(sc)]{Bsc} (7)
where the primes on A1 and A2 are dropped.
If the functions F1(sc) and F2(sc) do not overlap, then a stochastic choice
will pick out a state in either F1 or F2. However, it is possible that the pulses
do overlap as shown in fig. 1, and that the stochastic choice picks out a state in
the overlap. In that case, the amplitude of the chosen pulse will be the entire
bracketed coefficient of the pulse that appears in eq. 7.
A1 F1(u)(tsc)
Amplitude
B1 B2Bsc States
A2 F2(u)(tsc)
u
Figure 1
Evidently the initial apparatus superposition in eq. 6 is replaced by a differ-
ent superposition in eq. 7. The observer fails to reduce the initial superposition
to just one of the two eigenstates, because he cannot fully resolve the two eigen-
values.
The experimental meaning of the superposition in eq. 7 can be clarified by
disabling one of the apparatus states, say A1, and noting the probability that A2
continues to be observed. For example, imagine that the observable associated
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with A1 is a spot of light appearing on a screen, and the observable associated
with A2 is another spot of light that is so close to the first that it cannot be
fully resolved by the observer. To decide if he is looking at the first or the
second spot following a stochastic choice, the observer turns off the first source
of light, and notes that the spot does or does not remain. When that is done at
time toff , eq. 7 becomes
Φ(t ≥ toff > tsc) = A2(tsc)F2(sc){Bsc}
The probability that the spot is observed in the second apparatus state can be
found by integrating the square modulus of this expression and making use of
the Born rule.
P
(sc)
2 (t > toff ) = (1/s)
∫
dx
∫
dαΦ∗Φ = (1/s)
∫
dxA∗2A2F2(sc)
∗F2(sc)
where s is the square modulus of eq. 6.
If the experiment is performed many times, then summing over all the possi-
ble stochastic choices, the probability of observing the second apparatus eigen-
value will be
P2(t > toff ) =
∫
d(sc)P
(sc)
2 (t > toff )
= (1/s)
∫
dxA∗2A2
∫
d(sc)F2(sc)
∗F2(sc)
= (1/s)
∫
dxA∗2A2
This is the same result that one would expect if the states {B1} and {B2} were
completely resolvable.
It should be noted that if the observer becomes disengaged from the ap-
paratus at some time tdis after the stochastic hit in eq. 7, the system would
become
Φ(t ≥ tdis > tsc) = [A1(tsc)F1(sc) +A2(tsc)F2(sc)]{X} (8)
where {X} is the disengaged state that evolves from {Bsc} in physiological time.
This expression makes the independence of the observer and the system more
apparent. The effect of the observation has therefore been to change the system
from the initial apparatus superposition (A1+A2) in eq. 6 to the superposition
A1(tsc)F1(sc) + A2(tsc)F2(sc) in eq. 8. The observation brings about a state
reduction, but it does not reduce the state to either A1 or A2 as would normally
be expected. As previously stated, this is because the observer cannot clearly
resolve the two possibilities, so he cannot clearly reduce the system to one or
the other eigenstate.
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The probability of the final state of the system in eq. 7 is found by inte-
grating the variables dx, dα, and d(sc) over the entire time of the physiological
interaction leading to eq. 7.
P2(t > tsc) = (1/s)
∫
dx
∫
dα
∫
d(sc) [A1F1(sc) +A2F2(sc)]
∗
× [A1F1(sc)+, A2F2(sc)]{Bsc}
∗{Bsc}
= (1/s)
∫
dx [A∗1A1 +A
∗
2A2]
which is the same as the probability of the initial state in eq. 6.
If the unknown state {X} in eq. 6 is a single unconscious state, then the
resulting ready brain states that engage the apparatus will also be single states
B1 and B2. In that case, it will always be possible for the reduction to make
an unambiguous choice between B1 and B2. This does not mean that the
observer will be able to psychologically resolve the two, but only that the rule
(3) reduction will not lead to a superposition in these circumstances.
Pulse Drift
Rule (2) requires that all newly emerging and discrete active brain states are
ready states. Clearly, the states within a conscious pulse are intended to be
psychologically indistinguishable from one another; however, distinguishability
or discreteness in the sense of rule (2) will be given a more narrow meaning. If
the conscious pulse {Bk} is said to include the immediate neighborhood of Bk
(i.e., those states that are psychologically indistinguishable from Bk), then I will
say that only the most immediate neighbors of Bk are the ones that are exempt
from rule (2), and are thereby directly influenced by Bk . Only these states
are pulled directly into existence by Bk during pulse formation, and they will
have a lesser amplitude than Bk. They, in turn, will pull their most immediate
neighbors into the pulse, again with lesser amplitude. In this way, the entire
pulse is drawn into being around the initial central state Bk.
This means that the pulse does not have a definite edge. However, there
is still a decisive limit to the influence of each state within the pulse, beyond
which rule (2) applies to interactions involving that particular state.
With this understanding, there is nothing in the rules that would prevent a
conscious pulse from drifting continuously about the brain, moving over a wide
range of brain states without the necessity of hopping stochastically from one
place to another. As a pulse of this kind drifts forward, the conscious states
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in its leading edge will gain amplitude, and those in its trailing edge will lose
amplitude, without engaging ready brain states as required by rule (2).
Now consider what will happen when the conscious pulse drifts continuously
over the brain in this way, while at the same time giving rise to a ready brain
pulse as in eq. 4. A ready brain pulse cannot move like an ordinary pulse.
Its trailing edge cannot feed current to its leading edge because of rule (4), so
the amplitude of a single component of the ready pulse can only increase by
virtue of current coming from the conscious pulse3. The moment that current
stops for any reason, the ready component will become a stationary “phantom”
component that serves no further purpose4. It will not follow the motion of
the conscious pulse. So instead of there being a moving ready brain pulse that
parallels the motion of a conscious pulse of decreasing amplitude, there will be
a trail of ready states that become phantoms the moment they settle down to
a constant amplitude.
Intensity of a Conscious Experience
In classical physics, intensity is proportional to square amplitude; whereas in
standard quantum mechanics, intensity is implicit in the definition of a state
rather than in its amplitude. That’s because the square modulus in a quantum
mechanical state refers only to probability in a standard quantum mechanical
treatment; and in the present treatment it doesn’t even do that. So in the
quantum case, a non-zero conscious state is always fully conscious, independent
of its amplitude. This is why we require that a stochastically chosen conscious
state Bk is normalized to 1.0. It will be either on or off. It can have no
intermediate value. This is also why a conscious pulse {Bk} is normalized to
1.0. It too can have no intermediate value. Of course the component in which
the state or pulse appears can have intermediate values, but the on-off nature
of consciousness is represented here by the normalization of a state or a pulse,
not by a component.
The quality of consciousness (including intensity) is governed in every case
by the Hamiltonian. So the intensity of a psychological experience that is asso-
ciated with a conscious pulse {Bk} is a function of the definition of the states
that are involved. It is one thing if a state constitutes an experience on a sun-lit
3This is another example of how rule (4) prevents an anomalous increase in probability.
Trailing edge current flowing into the leading edge would otherwise cause extraneous rule (3)
reductions. Other examples are in refs. 1 and 2.
4The properties of a phantom component are defined in ref. 1.
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landscape, and another if it is an experience in a darkened basement. In either
case, the Hamiltonian of the state will assign a lesser intensity to the neigh-
borhood states surrounding the central state. This means that the intensity of
the observer’s experience will fade out at the edge of a conscious pulse. We
represent this modulation of intensity by the function Fk(u) in eq. 2.
If we quantify the “intrapulse” intensity I by saying that it equals 1.0 for
each conscious pulse (corresponding to each pulse being fully conscious), then
dI = Fk(u)
∗Fk(u)du will be the relative intensity of the differential range of
states in the vicinity of Bk. The square modulus of Bk does not have a formal
interpretation in this treatment, but its intensity relative to other states within
a pulse can certainly be represented in this way.
Fading in and out
The question then is: does a fully conscious experience arise discontinuously
when a conscious pulse comes into being? And conversely, is the experience
turned off discontinuously as a conscious pulse is reduced to zero? The rules are
flexible enough to allow the Hamiltonian to introduce or withdraw consciousness
continuously over finite intervals of time.
u
Bsc
u
Square
Modulus
u
BscBsc
Figure 2
The first stage in fig. 2 shows the stochastically chosen state the moment it
is created. The Hamiltonian reduces its amplitude in the second stage, giving
rise to a pulse that only involves its “most immediate” neighbors. In the third
stage, the initial state is completely absorbed into the pulse, and the width
of the pulse has expanded to a degree that allows a full conscious experience.
Although the initial state is technically conscious, it is too narrow to support
a recognizable psychological experience. The number of states involved in the
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second stage of fig. 2 will support some degree of the full experience, but only
the third stage supports the full experience. This sequence allows the observer
to become gradually aware of the pulse on a time scale that is governed by the
Hamiltonian. At the same time, it does not violate the on-off principle that is
represented in the normalization of the state-plus-pulse.
The converse cannot be true in the same way. Rule (3) requires that a
conscious state will go immediately to zero if there is a stochastic choice of
another state; and this suggests that there can be no gradual phasing out of
a conscious experience. However, there may be another mechanism that will
come to the rescue. The Hamiltonian might provide for the existence of an
“after glow” of any terminated conscious experience. This could occur through
another interaction that is in parallel with the primary interaction; and it might
well be related to the interaction that puts any conscious experience into short-
term memory. If that is true, then the Hamiltonian would control the extent
to which the observer fades in or out of consciousness, and that is certainly the
desired result.
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